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Abstract
In  this article we analyse the  impact of  the  interaction  between cross-border mergers and 
acquisitions and the quality of the institutional setting on domestic investment using panel data 
for 22 European transition countries from 2000 to 2014. We investigate whether the progress and 
durability of institutional reforms have a crucial influence on the economic performance of cross-
border mergers and acquisitions in  transition  countries. Our empirical findings indicate that 
contemporaneous cross-border mergers and acquisitions have a crowding-out effect on domestic 
investment in the year of merger or acquisition, but the influence of their lagged level has a strong 
crowding-in effect one year later. We find that the overall quality of the institutional setting and 
the rule of law negatively and significantly affect the relation between this type of foreign direct 
investment and domestic investment, both in the short and long run. Political stability exhibits 
a positive and significant impact on domestic investment in the current period and over time.
Keywords: cross-border mergers and acquisitions, institutional setting, domestic investment, 
transition countries
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1. Introduction
The growth of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) is increasing considerably, as the technology 
development and the process of international capital flows liberalization. This is also relevant 
for cross-border mergers and acquisitions (C-B M&A), the economic effects of which 
depend on the underlying economic and political conditions in the host countries (Pinto and 
Zhu, 2009). In the early stages of transition C-B M&A have a dominant position in the FDI 
structure. The majority of countries initiate a process of privatization in which C-B M&A 
transactions are of crucial importance. The foreign privatization accounts for a substantial 
share of the FDI flows in transition countries (Rojec, 2005). By opening their markets to 
foreign goods and capital, transition countries allow the unhindered entry of multinational 
companies in order to overcome an obsolete production structure and mitigate inherited 
systematic problems in the economy. 
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The privatization of state-owned enterprises offers unique one-off investment 
opportunities and, at the same time, provides conditions for market economy development 
(Djarova, 2004). This process does not include a simple ownership transformation of state 
enterprises but also the creation of favourable environment for the emergence and 
development of the private sector. FDI assists in the process of economic growth of these 
economies since it increases the degree of competition in the domestic market, as well as 
the efficiency of local companies (Kostovc et al., 2007). This type of capital flow represents 
opportunity to reduce technological gap between transition and developed countries. It is 
seen as useful factor for convergence and catching up, whose impact strongly depends 
on quality of domestic policy management (Lipschitz et al., 2001). For instance, Hudea and 
Stancu (2012) argue that FDI makes a greater contribution to the income growth of countries 
which implement comprehensive privatization programmes.
The main objective of this paper is to investigate the role of the institutional setting 
as a determinant of economic effects of C-B M&A on domestic investment with the help 
of dynamic panel data covering 22 European transition countries from 2000 to 20141. 
For that purpose, we employed multiple interaction terms between C-B M&A and each 
of the governance indicators. The results of this research will broaden our understanding 
of the interdependence of the institutional setting and the economic effects of C-B M&A 
on domestic investment. We did not succeed in finding any studies in literature that 
deal explicitly with the nexus between institutions and the economic effects of M&A 
because authors usually focus on the impact of aggregate inward FDI flows on the host 
country. We filled this gap by using the institutional analysis for a better understanding 
of the interdependence of the institutional setting and the economic effects of C-B M&A 
on domestic investment in European transition countries. To the best of our knowledge, there 
is only one empirical study (Jude, 2014) dealing with the impact of C-B M&A on domestic 
investment in transition countries. In addition, by taking into account various governance 
indicators, we investigated the most exposed areas of the institutional setting.
This paper is organized into five sections. In Section 2 we give a literature review 
of the papers dealing with economic effects of FDI inflows as well as C-B M&A on domestic 
investment; Section 3 provides model and data used in the empirical analysis; in Section 4 
we present the results and provide interpretations. 
2. Literature Review
There is no scientific consensus on the economic effects of FDI inflows as well as C-B 
M&A in host countries. FDI is usually considered as the major form of international 
capital flows that enables long-run economic growth, competitiveness and successful 
integration of countries into the global economy. Its positive economic effects are already 
visible in the short run, while those from C-B M&A can be mainly expected over time. These 
1 Albania, Armenia, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, 
Georgia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova, Montenegro, Poland, Romania, 
Russia, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia and Ukraine.
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benefits are usually reflected in the increase of total investible funds, rising employment, 
availability of innovative technology, introduction of contemporary management practices 
and preventing potentially profitable assets from being wiped out (UNCTAD, 1999; 
Ovin and Maček, 2010).
In the year of merger or acquisition, this type of investment usually causes lay-offs, 
crowding-out of domestic investment, downgrading, closure or relocation of production. 
Among the other characteristics there are lack of reciprocal access for local firms 
in the market for corporate control, anti-competitive behaviour, reduction of host country’s 
exports or increase of imports etc. (OECD, 2007). The economic effects of C-B M&A 
at the micro- and macro- economic level largely depend on the host country institutional 
quality. Chan et al. (2008) argue that economic, political and social institutions have 
a strong impact on variation and level of foreign affiliate performance. The authors show 
that the extent to which the level of institutional development affects this performance is 
significantly associated with the presence of institutional voids, the relative influences 
of institutional ability and strategic choices of actions. 
In terms of the influence on domestic investment, one group of authors finds evidence 
that FDI inflows have a positive or neutral effect on domestic investment, while others point 
out that an increase in FDI inflow causes a strong crowding-out effect. Farla et al. (2016) 
show that FDI inflows contribute positively to domestic investment. They point out that 
this positive spillover effect is often offset by the negative impact of rent-seeking interests 
in the provision of preferential treatment of foreign investors on investment. Their findings 
are consistent with the results of Munemo (2014) who argues that the complementarity 
between FDI and domestic investment is determined by the quality of business regulation. 
Similarly, Kamaly (2014) finds out that FDI stimulate domestic investment in most countries 
included in his sample but this impact largely depends on country-specific factors which 
had influence on that nexus. He shows that while the immediate effect of FDI on investment 
is mostly positive, the impact of lagged FDI values could cause crowding-out effect 
in some countries. Al-Sadig (2013) also provides evidence about the crowding-in effect 
of FDI on domestic private investment on the sample of developing countries. He indicates 
that the positive effects of FDI in low-income developing countries are determined by 
the availability of human resources. 
By considering the effects of two modes of FDI on domestic investment on the sample 
of developing countries, Ashraf and Herzen (2014) find that C-B M&A do not have 
a significant crowding-out effect on domestic investment, while greenfield FDI has a large 
effect. Calderon et al. (2004) argue that both greenfield and M&A lead domestic investment 
but are driven by gross domestic product (GDP) growth. According to their findings, 
economic growth represents an effective “pull” factor for foreign investment, and from 
the other side, FDI stimulate the growth of domestic investment in the future.
Wang (2010) points out that FDI may contemporaneously crowding-out domestic 
investment, but its impact could become positive over time. These findings are consistent 
with the results of Jude (2014) who demonstrates that FDI crowds out domestic investment 
but its impact weakens over time. The author stresses out that C-B M&A do not cause 
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any significant effect on domestic investment, while greenfield FDI may develop long-
run complementaries with domestic investment. Adams (2009) also shows that the contem-
poraneous FDI has negative effect on domestic investment and subsequent positive effect 
in later periods. 
Morrissey and Udomkerdmongkol (2012) investigate the role of institutional setting 
in mediating effects of FDI on domestic investment. Their findings reveal that FDI crowds out 
the domestic private investment and this impact is closely related to quality of institutional 
setup. They note negative and significant interaction effects of three governance indicators 
(voice and accountability, regulatory quality and control of corruption) and FDI on domestic 
private investment. According to their results, the extent of the crowding-out of domestic 
investment increases as institutional quality improves in the host country. 
3. Empirical Model and Data
Following the approach of Morrissey and Udomkerdmongkol (2012) and Farla et al. (2016), 
we estimated the effect of C-B M&A on domestic investment with this form of panel model 
specification:
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with subscripts i and t denoting country and time, respectively, and β0 to β6 regres-
sion coefficients. DIit represents domestic investment calculated as the difference between 
gross fixed capital formation and FDI inflows; DIit−1 is the lagged dependent variable; 
M&Asit stands for M&As as a percentage of GDP; M&Asit−1 is the lagged variable; INSit 
is institutional quality variable based on either overall institutional quality index or one 
of the governance indicators (defined differently in each model),while CONit is a vector 
of investment determinants including lagged GDP growth (Growthit−1); inflation measured 
by the consumer price index (CPI) (annual %) (Inflationit) and the real interest rate (Interestit). 
We included the overall institutional quality index and separate governance indicators, 
aiming to distinguish their contribution to the domestic investment. Overall institutional 
quality index is a composite governance indicator constructed with the Principal 
Component Analysis method. This multivariate statistical technique was employed in order 
to extracts the most important elements from Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGIs) 
data: Voice and Accountability (VA), Political Stability and Absence of Violence (PSAV), 
Government Effectiveness (GE), Regulatory Quality (RQ), Rule of Law (RL) and Control 
of Corruption (CC). The value of indicators ranges from –2.5 to 2.5, whereas the higher 
number means better quality of institutional setting. The first principal component derived 
from these indicators helps us explain about 86% of the variations in the original six 
governance indicators. In addition, according to the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) measure 
of sampling adequacy (0.90), the data is suitable for PCA. Therefore, we were able to use 
the first PCA component as an indicator for an assessment of the impact of institutional 
quality in transition countries and thus eliminate problems which could occur due to 
omitted-variable bias.
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The governance indicators are also included in regressions one at a time in order 
to avoid multicollinearity between them. The complementarity between C-B M&A and 
the quality of institutional setting was considered by including interactions between this form 
of FDI and different WGIs. This data was taken from the World Bank database produced 
by Kaufmann and Kraay (2015). These measurements are based on expert evaluations and 
surveys of households and businesses related to different areas of the institutional setup. 
The WGIs were calculated from 1996 onwards covering over 200 countries and they are 
available on a two-year basis until 2002 (and an annual basis thereafter). 
We applied the system Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimation technique 
in order to assess the dynamic nature of C-B M&A. The system GMM estimator helped us to 
reduce biased parameter estimates and the imprecision associated with other methods. GMM 
panel estimator is able to control for the presence of unobserved country-specific effects, 
as well as for a simultaneity bias caused by the potential endogeneity of the explanatory 
variables. System GMM estimator is used for overcoming the shortcomings of Difference 
GMM counterparts which occur due to short sample periods and persistent series (Blundell 
and Bond, 1998). Since the variables of institutional setting are highly persistent over time, 
the lagged levels of the series provide weak instruments for subsequent first-differences 
(Bond et al., 2001). For example, institutions are resistant to change and this applies 
in particular to informal institutions. These social norms are formed over a long period 
of time and emerged out of habits (North, 1990). Unlike the formal institutions, which could 
be changed relatively quickly, inherited habits require a longer period for their adaptation. 
System GMM estimator also allows us to capture the effects of lagged C-B M&A on current 
economic effects of C-B M&A. By using lagged levels in the equation, the econometric 
specification is changed to a dynamic panel. 
 We used two-step estimates in order to produce theoretically robust results and 
performed the ‘Windmeijer correction’ (Windmeijer, 2005) using Stata’s ‘small’ command 
(Roodman, 2009). We considered the lagged dependent variable and C-B M&As as 
endogenous, with GMM-style instruments. The one-period lag of growth was included 
in order to avoid a potential endogeneity problem as in the study of Wang (2010), Jude (2014) 
and Al-Sadig (2013). The collapse option was used to reduce the size of the instruments 
matrix in order to obtain one instrument per variable instead of one instrument for each 
variable in each period.
The Hansen test was employed to analyse the appropriateness of the model specification 
and validity of overidentifying restrictions. The presence of serial correlation in the random 
error terms was tested in order to achieve consistent estimates of the parameters. We checked 
for the first and second order serial correlations of the differenced residuals. According to 
the Arellano and Bond (1991), there should be first-order serial correlation, but there should 
not be second-order serial correlation in the first-difference residuals.
For the estimation of the coefficient and the standard error of the long-run effects 
of C-B M&A on domestic investment we took into account the explanation given by 
Papke and Wooldridge (2005) and used the command ‘nlcom’ in STATA 12. The long-run 
coefficients are the product made by multiplying the estimated coefficients by the long-term 
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multiplier 
1
1
1   (where β1 represents the estimated coefficient of the lagged dependent 
variable). The standard errors for these coefficients were computed using the delta-method. 
All the estimations were performed using xtabond2 programme written by Roodman (2009). 
Data for real GDP growth, inflation as a variable for macroeconomic instability and 
the real interest rate was taken from the World Bank, while data on the value of C-B M&A 
was taken from the United Nation Conference on Trade and Development FDI database. 
4. Results
The signs of the coefficients of the variables in Table 1 are largely as expected. The p-values 
of the Hansen test statistics for all specifications range from 0.598 to 0.839, which clearly 
indicates that the instruments are valid. In addition, we did not find evidence of second-
order serial correlations. The coefficients of the lagged dependent variable have values 
which are less than unity suggesting the existence of the convergence process. The lagged 
domestic investment has positive and highly significant coefficients in all our regressions. 
The estimated coefficients of current C-B M&A (in the year of merger or acquisition) are 
negative and statistically significant in all regressions (except in column 3). The coefficients 
on C-B M&A range from −1.49 to −0.74, which clearly indicates that this type of FDI 
crowds out domestic investment. The signs of coefficients are not surprising considering 
that this type of FDI involves a transfer of ownership from domestic to foreign company and 
does not immediately lead to an increase of its productive capacity or introduction of new 
or better technologies. 
In the early stages of the transition process, the majority of countries (especially those 
from SEE and the CIS region) carried out the privatization of domestic companies, without 
paying too much attention to the final consequences. Economic policy makers gave priority 
to the advantages that FDI brings to the host country, while its negative economic effects 
(both short- and long-run) were disregarded. In these conditions, where the capital market 
and institutional framework for business continuity are not sufficiently developed, FDI 
inflow was possible mainly through the privatization process. 
The main adverse effects of the privatization process in its initial stages are a re-
duction in production and an increase in unemployment due to the restructuring of existing 
capacities or the closing down of businesses which are incapable of withstanding competitive 
pressure on the domestic market. FDI is mainly directed at capital intensive businesses 
meaning its contribution to increasing employment rates is limited. 
In addition, host transition governments implement strategies, which involve number 
of incentives for FDI attraction. Foreign investors are guaranteed full freedom of investment 
process, legal protection and security, unhindered transfer of profit, as well as national 
treatment and favourable legislation. The better treatment of foreign investors usually 
derives from the discretion of politicians and bureaucrats. Investment projects are often 
realized on the basis of contacts of political leaders and officials from state institutions 
with representatives of foreign companies. The choice of investment location depends 
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on the political connections and financial subsidies for job creation. The over-stimulative 
policies to attract FDI carry with them a great risk as they send a signal to potential 
investors that they do not have to base their business concept on long-run production. 
Namely, financial incentives were given without adequate control and were accompanied 
by failures in procedures. Foreign investors complied with their contractual obligations for 
as long as they received state subsidies. However, having benefitted as far as they could 
from the incentives available, they usually reduced the number of employees. In such 
circumstances, domestic companies are put at a disadvantage since they are faced with strong 
competition on the local financial market which raises the price of investment (Harrison and 
McMillian, 2003). The small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) experience difficulties 
in providing short-term and long-term funding sources. Mencinger (2003) stresses out that 
the entry of foreign investors in transition countries gave rise to monopoly which displaced 
domestic firms. 
The direct impact of one-year lagged M&A on FDI is positive and significant 
in all our regressions in Table 1. The positive coefficient of lagged M&A (one year after 
merger or acquisition) indicates a possible crowding-in effect, as shown in the study 
of Wang (2010). C-B M&A contribute to an increase in domestic investment one 
year after their realization due to enhancement of cooperation between domestic and 
foreign investors, technology spillover effects, development of employees’ skills and 
the formation of a network of SMEs involved in the activities of foreign partners. SMEs 
contribute to FDI inflows through business cooperation, subcontracting, franchises, and 
the transfer of technology. The rise in employment could be expected mainly in the mid- 
or long-run when company achieves a satisfactory level of profitability. In addition, 
domestic investment growth can be stimulated by foreign investors who, by re-investing 
profits, not only contribute to the expansion of existing capacities, but also to an increase 
in the efficiency of certain branches or sectors. 
However, from the long-run perspective, the impact of this form of FDI on domestic 
investment proved to be negative. According to our estimates in Table 2, the coefficients 
of C-B M&A are negative and highly statistically significant in almost all columns (with 
the exception of column 3), which strongly support the fact that this type of FDI crowds 
out domestic investment over time. We believe that foreign investors can be led by short-
term speculative interests, which have a negative impact on all aspects of economic 
life in host country. In addition, we cannot neglect the reverse side of FDI inflows i.e. 
negative externalities stemmed from the difference in potential growth of GDP and gross 
national product (GNP), especially in transition countries which are characterized as 
net importers of capital. The results of activities of foreign companies are not included 
in the calculation of country’s GNP. It means, that rise in GDP does not show the real 
potential for the improvement of living standards in FDI recipient countries. The difference 
in growth rates of GDP and GNP draws attention to the issue of suitable indicator for 
macroeconomic performance. 
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Table 1  |  GMM Estimates of the Effect of C-B M&A on Domestic Investment
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
DI(−1)      0.574***(0.066)
     0.586***
(0.071)
     0.558***
(0.061)
    0.572***
(0.068)
    0.553***
(0.059)
    0.598***
(0.079)
   0.589***
(0.075)
M&A   −1.337***(0.226)
−1.498***
(0.390)
−0.746   
(0.736)
   −1.351***
(0.211)
−1.054**
(0.397)
−1.483***
(0.430)
  −1.444***
(0.253)
M&A(−1)      0.493***(0.136)
      0.486***
(0.172)
    0.450** 
(0.164)
     0.480***
(0.143)
     0.432***
(0.142)
     0.484***
(0.167)
0.502***
(0.145)
Growth (−1) 0.077    (0.050)
0.073    
(0.048)
0.074    
(0.056)
0.074    
(0.052)
0.0624  
(0.053)
0.084    
(0.054)
0.084    
(0.050)
Inflation −0.031     (0.032)
−0.035     
(0.034)
−0.004     
(0.036)
−0.028     
(0.033)
−0.050     
(0.031)
−0.063*   
(0.033)
−0.050   
(0.034)
Interest   −0.091**(0.038)
−0.096   
(0.044)
−0.059   
(0.037)
−0.086**  
(0.039)
  −0.104***
(0.037)
   −0.111***
(0.037)
 −0.104**
(0.038)
Overall INS 0.176    (0.200) – – – – – –
Overall INS* M&A    −0.131**(0.057) – – – – – –
CC – 0.710    (0.815) – – – – –
CC* M&A – −0.463   (0.598) – – – – –
PSAV – –     2.107***(0.448) – – – –
PSAV* M&A – – −1.071   (0.724) – – – –
RL – – – 0.679    (0.669) – – –
RL* M&A – – –    −0.675***(0.240) – – –
VA – – – – −0.268   (0.624) – –
VA* M&A – – – – −0.354   (0.220) – –
RQ – – – – – −0.133   (0.594) –
RQ* M&A – – – – – 0.040    (0.235) –
GE – – – – – – 0.216    (0.706)
GE* M&A – – – – – – −0.142   (0.210)
Time effect yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Number 
of observations 247 247 247 247 247 247 247
Number of groups 22 22 22 22 22 22 22
Number 
of instruments 14 14 14 14 14 14 14
Hansen test 
(p-value) 0.758 0.598 0.687 0.654 0.839 0.738 0.747
AR(1) 0.007 0.006 0.007 0.008 0.011 0.005 0.005
AR(2) (p-value) 0.939 0.911 0.900 0.996 0.996 0.927 0.919
Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level.
Source: Author’s calculations
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Table 2  |  The Long-Run Impact of Changes in C-B M&A on Domestic Investment
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
M&As    −3.138***(0.738)
   −3.622***
(1.285)
−1.690
(1.649)
    −3.160***
(0.753)
   −2.360**
(1.014)
  −3.694**
(1.513)
  −3.519***
(0.992)
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level. 
The coefficients were calculated using the ‘nlcom’ command in Stata 12. These results are based on the co-
lumns in Table 1.
Source: Author’s calculations
The one-year lagged GDP growth in Table 1 has statistically insignificant effect on 
domestic investment, even though the estimated coefficients have the predicted signs. 
We show that the higher rate of inflation and high real interest rates discourage domestic 
investment in the current period. While the coefficient of inflation is negative but not 
statistically significant (with the exception of the column 6), the impact of real interest rates 
proves to be negative and statistically significant in almost all our regressions.  
According to our results in the first column of Table 1, the coefficient of the proxy 
of overall institutional quality is positive but insignificant as opposed to the coefficient 
of its interaction with C-B M&A, which is consistent with the findings of Farla et al. 
(2016). Our results show that the overall quality of the institutional setting negatively 
and significantly affects the relation between this type of FDI and domestic investment. 
Based on the sign and significance of this interaction term, we conclude that institutional 
improvements have a negative mediation effect on the relationship between C-B M&A 
and domestic investment activity. We believe that improvement in institutional settings has 
a strong impact on the attraction of foreign investors, whereas the effect of rent-seeking 
is more important than the influence of technology spillovers. In addition, the significant 
interaction effect of overall institutional quality index and C-B M&A might indicate that 
institutional improvements are not in line with the investment motives and expectations 
of foreign enterprises. 
Moreover, we should be aware of the fact that a government’s efforts to improve 
the institutional quality may also be insufficient. This problem is particularly evident when 
it comes to corruption. Countries in transition face systematic corruption, underpinned 
by the existence of collusion between financial magnates, political parties, the executive 
government, and the judiciary. Foreign investors are not infrequently forced to comply with 
conditions set down by the ruling political structures, which directly impose the business 
conditions on them. The majority of them are forced to abandon the idea of investing. 
On the other hand, it should be pointed out that this lack of transparency in the business 
environment can encourage certain foreign investors to undertake speculative activities, 
the aim of which is nothing to do with improving social well-being, but instead solely 
serving their business interests.
The negative mediation effect of C-B M&A and overall institutional quality index 
could also means that the efforts for the institutional setting improvement in its different 
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fields are not coordinated. This implies that there might be overlapping or even a conflict 
between different institutions’ responsibilities. We believe that institutional reforms 
in different areas were not complementary to each other, which was negatively reflected 
on domestic investment. Therefore, the only logical solution of this problem is to provide 
an institutional pluralism, i.e. synergistic actions of all institutional structures in order to 
avoid possible counterfeits.
In Table 1 the coefficient of PSAV is highly significant and drastically higher than 
for other significant governance indicators. We conclude that this governance indicator is 
a crucial determinant of domestic investment in transition countries. The interaction effect 
for PSAV is also negative and high but not significant. It is worth noting that in column 
3 the coefficient of C-B M&A is insignificant, but notably lower than in other columns. 
We argue that stability of the political system influences the level of foreign investors’ 
confidence, which reflects achievements in institutional reform. Therefore, with 
the creation of a more stable and open political system, new investment opportunities may be 
available despite the crowding-out effect of FDI (Morrissey and Udomkerdmongkol, 2012). 
Frequent changes to laws and regulations give the impression that investment carries with 
it increased risk as legislation could be favourable at one point in time, while later it could 
render it impossible to plan business operations. Foreign investors expect to be able to have 
confidence in governments of countries in transition in terms of the provision of personal 
and property security for business continuity.
Surprisingly, the coefficients for VA and RQ are negative but not statistically significant, 
while other governance indicators are positive. These two indicators obviously correlate 
negatively with domestic investment because a government may formulate and implement 
policies and regulations that threaten private sector development. 
Almost all the coefficients of the interaction term between the governance indicators 
and C-B M&A have negative signs (except for RQ*MAs). The high significance 
of the interaction terms between the RL and C-B M&A reflects the indirect influence 
on the C-B M&A-investment nexus. This negative interaction indicates that the legal 
system in transition countries is not enforced to stimulate investment activity, both foreign 
and domestic. The negative mediation effects of C-B M&A and the overall institutional 
quality index and RL on domestic investment could be explained by the fact that improving 
the institutional setting does not always lead to the creation of positive economic 
effects at the macroeconomic level as changes can bring about conditions for the inflow 
of speculative capital. Therefore, improvement in the quality of the institutional setting and 
the formation of a financial framework for FDI attraction should not become a threat to 
market principles and lead to the preferential treatment of non-resident investment. 
489Prague Economic Papers, 2018, 27(4), 479–493, https://doi.org/10.18267/j.pep.665
Table 3  |  The long-Run Effect of Changes in Institutional Quality on Domestic Investment
Variable Long-run coefficient
Overall INS    0.414     (0.468)
Overall INS* M&A −0.307*   (0.158)
CC    1.717      (1.904)
CC* M&A −1.120     (1.481)
PSAV    4.769*** (1.109)
PSAV*M&A −2.425     (1.773)
RL   1.589      (1.542)
RL*M&A −1.580** (0.720)
VA −0.601     (1.376)
VA*M&A −0.793      (0.518)
RQ −0.332       (1.482
RQ*M&A    0.101      (0.592)
GE    0.526    (1.717)
GE*M&A −0.348     (0.512)
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level.
The coefficients were calculated using the ‘nlcom’ command in Stata 12. These results are based on the co-
lumns in Table 1.
Source: Author’s calculations
According to the long-run estimates in Table 3, we find that PSAV and the inter-
action terms between C-B M&A and RL and overall institutional quality index exhibit 
a significant impact on domestic investment. The PSAV variable is positive and statistically 
significant suggesting that strengthening political governance for security and stability 
enhance domestic investment over time. The long-run effects of these interactions terms 
with C-B M&A are negative and statistically significant suggesting that there is a negative 
mediation effect on domestic investment in the long-run. 
5. Conclusion
The issue we have addressed is whether the quality of the institutional setting has been 
a determinant of the economic effect of C-B M&A in 22 European transition countries 
in the period from 2000 to 2014. We have taken into consideration the effects 
of the interdependence of overall institutional quality as well as its different dimensions, 
and this form of FDI on domestic investment. We intended to discover the right channels 
through which the positive impact of C-B M&A may be transmitted to domestic 
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investment. Our findings suggest that contemporaneous M&A have a crowding-out effect 
on domestic investment, while the influence of their lagged level has a crowding-in effect. 
Their long-run impact is also negative and significant suggesting that foreign investors 
reduce the competition on the domestic market over time. Our findings are consistent with 
the conclusions of Jude (2014), Wang (2010) and Adams (2009), who provided evidence 
on the crowding-out effect of FDI on domestic investment in the current period. The authors 
argued that this impact of FDI weakens over time or even tends to be positive. For instance, 
Kosova (2010) also found that foreign entry has a negative effect on the growth and 
survival of domestic firms. Her findings revealed that crowding-out is a short-term or static 
phenomenon suggesting that initial foreign entry increases the exit rates of domestic firms. 
We have shown that foreign investors may be motivated by rent-seeking interests based 
on the fact that the interdependence of C-B M&A and the overall quality of the institutional 
setting has had a negative effect on domestic investment. We have found that political 
stability has a positive effect on domestic investment and is the only significant variable of all 
the institutional factors suggesting that this governance indicator is a crucial determinant 
of domestic investment in transition countries. Political stability has the strongest influence 
on the decision of foreign and domestic companies to undertake investment, and to share 
and spend their resources. 
The only significant interaction terms with a negative effect on domestic investment, 
are between C-B M&A and the Rule of Law and overall institutional quality index. These 
governance factors can be denoted as channels through which institutional quality may 
discourage domestic investment. We believe that the marked negative effect of C-B M&A 
outweighs the benefits achieved due to institutional change and development. The findings 
of other authors also give mixed results. Ours are consistent with the findings of Morrissey 
and Udomkerdmongkol (2012), who reported the negative mediation effect of FDI and 
three governance indicators (voice and accountability, regulatory quality and control 
of corruption) on domestic private investment. The authors asserted that this negative impact 
is related to quality of governance in developing countries: the extent of the crowding-out 
of domestic investment is higher when institutional quality improves. Farla et al. (2016) 
also pointed out that while the variable of institutional quality is positive and significant, its 
interaction with FDI is negative and significant.
Political Stability (positive coefficient) and the interaction terms between C-B M&A 
and Rule of Law and overall institutional quality index (both negative coefficients) have 
a significant impact on domestic investment in the long-run. Therefore, policy makers should 
create a strategy which will put domestic and foreign investors on an equal footing, aimed 
at reducing the impact of crowding-out on domestic investment. Transition countries are 
expected to provide foreign and domestic investors with a reliable and non-discriminatory 
legal framework, which will allow administrative procedures to be simplified for their 
business operations. Hence, it is necessary to define an adequate system of incentives, 
which should not threaten the principles of the market economy nor give preferential 
treatment to foreign investors over domestic ones. Incentive mechanisms for domestic 
and foreign investors would see an increase in their involvement in the economy, as well 
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as the level of internationally competitive value-added products and services. We believe 
that it is crucial to create financial incentives which would not only be aimed at particular 
regions, but also particular sectors. It is necessary to attract FDI to those sectors and projects 
which will enable the most efficient use of the country’s own resources and potential, and 
hence stimulate the development of the domestic private sector.
Policy makers should carefully take into account those institutional dimensions whose 
mediation effect with C-B M&A proved to be harmful for domestic investment activity, 
especially in the long-run (interactions with the overall institutional quality index and Rule 
of Law on domestic investment). These negative effects could be explained by the fact that 
improving the institutional setting does not always lead to the creation of positive economic 
effects at the macroeconomic level as changes can bring about conditions for the inflow 
of speculative capital. In order to maintain the long-run positive influence of M&A 
on domestic investment, it is important to continue with work on improving the quality 
of the institutional setting with a particular focus on the interaction this type of FDI has with 
different indicators, above all, Political Stability and Rule of Law.
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